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Introduction
The scenado is familiar: The
insured, present in counsel's office,
has suffered a loss involving home,
auto or business and has made a
claim for insurance. The insured
reports being shocked when the insurer said the loss was flot covered
because

of a condition or exclusion

or existing coverage was reduced by
an offset of limitation of liabiJity
clause. Usually, counsel is also surprised by the policy language that
defeats or reduces coverage or by the
way the insurer applies the policy
language to defeat coverage.
However, the insured's belief that
the policy covered the loss seems
reasonable, and the result appears

unfair. Counsel invariably wonders
whethet the offending insurance
policy provision can be deemed void
in Montana for violating the reasonable expectations of the insured.
After all, the court has protected the
rights of insureds by finding violations of the insured's reasonable
expectations in such notev/orthy
cases as

Horú

u. Progressiue Sþecialtl

Ins. Co.,2 (2003) and

Benr¿ett u. State

Farm Møtual,3 (1993).
Then there is the famous line by
Professor l(eeton, oft quoted by the

Montana Supreme Coutt,a "The obfectiveþ reasonable expectations of
appLicants and intended beneficiaries
regarding the terms of insurance
contracts will be honored even
though painstaking study of the
policy provisions would have negated
those expectations." It would be a
gleaming sword indeed that would
slay an insurance ptovision soleþ for
violating an insured's reasonable

expectations.
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\)Øhile the reasonable expectations doctrine in Montana varies
depending on the court you are in,

insurance policies.

it

is alive, well, and under-appreciated.
The courts are not clear on its theoretical basis, but use it libetally to
damn or bless insurance provisions.

Our inquiry here raises sevetal
questions, the biggest being, can we
in fact, void an insurance provision in
Montana solely because it violates the
insured's reasonable expectations?
Can the reasonable expectations doctrine be applied absent any fìnding
of ambiguity? Or, if the provision
violates the insuted's reasonable
expectations, is there automaticaþ
ambiguity? Can the insured have a
teasonable expectation in varnnce
with the policy provisions where
there is no ambiguity?

Montana State and Federal
Courts have cited reasonable expectations of the insured in perhaps
twenty decisions. ,4. review of those
decisions reveals that the doctrine is
frequently invoked by counsel for
insurance consumers and is readily
applied by state and federal coufts
either to void a provision altogether
or to resolve an ambiguity in a poJicy.
Nevertheless, reasonable expectations
decisions in Montana reflect a lack of
clartty about the doctrine resulting in
conflicting couft pronouncemefits.
Counsel who can advocate for clear
application of the doctrine have a
fìne tool for assuring that their clients

get the benefìt

of

MoNt¡Ne

the poJicy for

In the coffee

houses in London where the shipoq/ners negotiated insurance with

the underv¡riters, the terms weÍe
subiect to a certajtn amount of bargaining. Âs insurance spread to protection of property from fte and to
injury and damage atising out of
business, auto travel, and aviation, the
use of forms drafted by the insurers
or their ttade organizattons became
the convention. Today, only the most
sophisticated commercial insureds
and thek brokers are engaged in
negotiating an¡,thing other than price
and levels

of

coverage. The contracts

have become contracts

of

adhesion
which the insured can either accept

or reject
in total.
r\s contracts of adhesion, insurance policies were subject to the
general contract rule that ambiguity
is resolved against the draftsmen.
However, I(eeton, in studying tights_
in variance from the insurance policy
provisions, noticed the development
of a line of decisions in which
courts voided unambiguous provisions

in favor of the insured

based

solely on reasonable expectalions.
Hence, his famous assertion that the
objectively reasonable expectations
of the insured regarding the terms of
the policy "will be honored even
though painstaking study of the

policy ptovisions would have negated
those expectations."s l(eeton further
said:6

which they bargained.

Not only should
Professor Keeton's Concept
Reasonable Expectations

of

Historically, insureds played a
in formulating their

substantial role

a

policyholder's reasonable expectations be honored in the
face of diffìcult and technical
langtage, but those expecta-
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tions should prevail

as

well

when the language of an
unusual provision is clearþ

concludes that the insured's expecta-

coutt cited l(eeton's famous article

tions are not reâsonable because a clear

and quoted l(eeton's principle.e The

exclusion from coverage defeats them.

court ended by saying, "This policy

Classic Keeton: Voiding an insurance provision absent ambiguity
solely for violating the insureds
teasonable expectations
The Montana Supreme Court has
ruled insurance clauses void for vio-

is an adhesion contract that justi{ìes
this coutt's consideration of the
consumer apptoach,"1o
The court found no ambiguity
in Ro/e, the household exclusion
there being quite clear. Hence, Rolle
was the classic I(eeton principle case
that voided an unambiguous insur-

understandable, unless the

insuret can show that the
policyholder's failure to read
such language is unreasonable.

More specifìcally, and consistent
with the Montana court decisions,
I(eeton said, '1\n insurer will not be
permitted an unconscionable advantage in an insurance transaction, and

the reasonable expectations of appJicants and intended beneficiades will
be honored."T For l(eeton, the reasonable expectations doctrine is based in

unconscionabilty. Courts used ambiguity mereþ as a means to teach reasonable expectations, and the maiority
of decisions {ìnding ambiguity needed
reasonable expectations as a ground
for the ambiguity. necessary result
'{.

of basing reasonable expectations in
unconscionabiJity is that courts would
differentiate between sophisticated
and unsophisticated insureds, limiting
recovery fot insureds such as lawyers
and big business.

Whì1e the Montana courts have
regularþ appJied the doctrine of reasonable expectations, the decisions
have been inconsistent. However,
analysis of the Montana cases and
the reasoning of the state ând federal
courts,' allows us to categoine the
cases into roughly three lines: (1) those
cases arguably establishing that the
"reasonable expectations" doctrine is a
stand-alone doctrine based on unconscionabiìiry thus not tequiring a contract law fìnding of ambiguity to
trigger its application; (2) those cases
that apply the "reasonable expectations" doctfine as arì adjunct to contract la'w, thus requiring an ambiguity
in the contract language before looking
to the reasonable expectations of the
insured; and (3) those cases in which
there is no ambiguiry but the court
appears to apply the doctrine and

Tnrer Tne¡os
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lating an insured's reasonable expectations. Transamericø In¡. Co. u. Rojt/e,
(1983)8 appears to be the frst Montana" càse to apply the doctrine of
reasonable expectations, argaal:iry
adopting I(eeton's princþles verbattm. Ro/e involved a child âuto passenger who sued her mother for
quadrþlegic injuries she suffered as
a result of the mother's negligence
whjle driving the family auto.
Transameric a.'s avto poJicy included
a "household exclusion" which excluded coverage "for bodily injury to
âny person who is related by blood,
maringe, or adoption to fthe insured], if that person resides in fthe
insuredb] household at the time of
the loss." The Federal District Court
certified to the Montana Supreme
Coutt the following questions: (1)
whether the "household exclusion"
was valid, and Q) whether a parent was

ance provision for violating the
insured's reasonable expectations.
Doubters can only speculate whether

the coutt would have ruled the exclusion invalid for violating reasonable
expectations if the exclusion had not
also been found to be "expressly

outlawed" by the Mandatory Insurance Law:

In

1990, the Montana Supreme
Court cited Ro/e in finding that a

"limit of liabilty" clause in State
Farm's policy's definition of
"undetsinsufed vehicle" violated
the insured's teasonable expectations.
In Sun Farm Mwt Auto. Ins. Co. u.
Braøn,11 a Montana resident insured
for UIM with State Farm was killed

while riding in an auto operated and
insured in Canada. The Canadian
policy had BI limits of 200,000, ttut
Canadtàn tort law limited recovery

immune from tort liability to a child.

for death damages to funetal ex-

First, the Montana Supreme
Court held that, by enacting the Mandatory Insutance Law, MCA S 33-6301., "the legislatute has expressly
outlawed the'household exclusion."
Therefore, the inclusion of the clause
violated Montana public policy by
violating a statutory provision. Second, the court abrogated parental
immunity by holding that a parent is
not immune from a chld's tort action
arising from injury by automobile.
The court continued, "In addition,
we hold that the household exclusion
clause is invalid due to its failure to
'honot the reasonable expectations'
of the purchaser of the policy." The

penses only. The State Farm policy

promised to pay damages the insured
was "legally entitled to collect" from
an underinsured motorist and defined
an underinsured vehicle as one whose
limit of liabiJity for bodily injury
liabiJity was less than the victim's tort
damages. The policy required that
limit to be "used up by payment of
judgments or setdement" befote any
UIM benefìts would be payable. Consequently, State Farm refused any
UIM demand on the ground that
Braun was not entitled to collect
mofe than funeral expense under
Canadtan tott law so that the limit of

BI liabiJity would never be used.¡rp.
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The court ìn Montana held that
"legally entitled to collect" in UIM
referred only to establishment of
fault and not damages, and that, after
the fault threshold was met, UIM
coverage was governed by contract
law as opposed to tort law. The court
then resolved the case by concluding

that the "limit

of

JiabiJity" language

violated the reasonable expectatìons
of the insured. The coutt said, "The
insured could reasonably expect to
recover the difference between v¡hat
he could collect from the tortfeasor's
policy and his proven damages up to
the poìicy limits purchased." The

Montana Supreme Court the question
whether an "other insurance" clause
that prohibits stacking of underinsured motorist coverage provided
by separate policies from the same
insurer is void as against public
policy?
The Montana Supreme Court
rejected State Farm's argument that
because the Bennetts had only paid
for $100,000 UIM coverage under
each of their policies and not
$200,000, they could not teasonably
expect dual coverage under the unambþous "other insurance" clause

court did not fìnd ambþity, and the
case appears to illustrate the l(eeton

appearing in both policies. The court
reasoned that, by "the cleat and unambþous language of State Fatm's

approach. Ironically, the attorney
arguing against reasonable expectations for State Farm 'tn Braun was

insurance policy," the UIM coverage
was personal to the insured and not
dependent on the insured occupying

Lyman Bennett who had a reasonable
expectations spiritual awakening in
the next case in which the doctrine
arose in the Montana Supteme Coutt.

an insured vehicle. Hence, Bennett
could reasonably expect coverage up

Bennett u. State Farm Møt. Aato.
Tns. Co.t2 decided by the court in
1993, buttressed Ro/e and Braøn.
There, State Farm issued two auto

insurance policies with $100,000
Underinsured Motorist coverage
limits to Bozeman àttorney,Lyman
Bennett and his wife Bonnie. Bonnie
was struck and injured as a pedestrian
by an underinsured motorist and
sought to recover the limits of both
policies since she was an insured under
each policy. State Farm refused to p^y
both limits on the basis of an "other
insurance" clause limiting coverage to
the highest ümit of coverage where
there are multiple policies.
Bennett was originally removed to
federal court where Judge Hatfìeld
found the "other insurance" clause
ambþous and then found that voiding the clause comported with the
insured's reasonable expectations.l3

That decision was appealed to the
Ninth Circuit, which certified to the
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to the limits of both policies for
which she was an insured and for
which separate premiums had been
paid.

In holding the "other insurance"

The Bennett court asserted that
the promise to pay UIM benefìts was
clear and unambþous. On its face,
Bennelt still suppotts the argument
that an insurance provision can be

invalidated solely for failing to honor
the reasonable expectations of the
insuted. The Bennelt court did not say
ambiguity was tequired, not did it
fìnd any ambiguity in the policies at
issue.

In the 1995 companion
L¿ibrand

of

cases

Nationøl Farmers Unioru
Propory and Casaalry Co., and Cole
u.

u.

Track Insurance Exchange,la Federal

District Judge Shanstrom, certified to
the Montana Supreme Court the
question whether amendatory endotsements containing modifìed
household exclusions to auto coverage \Ã/ere valid and enforceable in
Montana. The insureds in each case
took the positions that the exclusions
were void and unenforceable for
1) being unclear and ambþous,
(2) violating their teasonable expecta.
tions, and (3) violating the public

policy

of Montana. The Montana

clause that prohibits stacking of the
UIM coverage void as against public

Supreme Court concluded that the
policy provisions at issue were un-

poJicy, the court summarily said:

clear, ambþous, and void. ,\ccordingly, the court declined tô reach the

In

Transamerica u. Ro/e (1983),

202Mont. 1.73, 656 P.zd 820,
we invalidated a "household
exclusion" clause in an automobile liabiJity policy because
it did not honor the reasonable
expectations of the insured.
lØe reaffìrmed that decision in
IVelhorzte u. Hone In¡ørance Ca
(1,993), 257 Mont. 354, 358,
849 P.2d 1.90,1.93, stating that
the "reasonable expectation
doctrine is in accord with our
strong public policy that insurance is intended to serve a
fundamental protective purpose. rü7e affium

it again

here.

issues

of whether the provisions

violated the insured's reasonable
expectations, or wefe void as contfary

to public policy.
Only if the coutt considered
reasonable expectations to be a separate ground for invalidating the modi-

fìed exclusion did the holding in
I ¿ibrand make serìse. If the court
considered reasonable expectâtions

only applicable to resolve ambþity,
there was no reason it could not
apply the doctrine to resolve the
ambiguity. In effect, the court said
that the provision was ambiguous so
as to be unenforceable, making a
fìnding of invalidity for violation of
reasonable expectations moot. There-
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fore, going to the trouble

of

detailing

a separate anaþsis would aPPe r
unnecessafy.

lnterestingly, while not citing
I(eeton, the court then discussed
unconscionabitity, the basis of
I(eeton's theory of reasonable expectations, saying:
\X/'hjle

we decide this case on
the basis of the ambiguity in
the policy language, we are not

unmindful of the insureds'
afguments that these contfacts
àre contra,cts of adhesion; that

full coverage for damages suffered by Íarrtily members is not
available on the open insurance market, and that to arbitrariþ preclude full coverage
for family members, as opposed to all other persons, is
unconscionable and void as a
mattet of public policy, and

therefore, unenforceable, regardless of the future clarity
of such an exclusion.

The court concluded that the
record was insuffìcient to evaluate
the policies there for unconscionability but allowed that it could be a
factor in any future consideration
of the validity of the provision.
While the court found ambigurty,
the decision impJicitly supports the
proposition that reasonable expectations is a stand-alone doctrine by
which a provision can be voided.
The court in State Farrn Mut Auto.
In¡. Co. u. Gibson,ls Q007) applied the
reasonable expectations doctrine to
void an "owned vehicle exclusion"
that State Farm drafted in to its MedicalPay coverage. The exclusion, which
acted as an anti-stacking provision,
had been previously held valid in
Lierboe u. State Farrnl6 (2003).

In

plaintiffs had paid
premiums
for Médical
three separate
Pay coverage on three autos and
sought to stack the coverage. As in
L;ierboe u. State Farn Q003), the insurer refused to stack coverage citing
the "owned-vehicle exclusion" which
provided there was no Medical Pay
coverage for any owned auto except
the "occupied" auto. The Gibsons
Gibson, the

argued the exclusion was invalid

as

against public policy. They apparently
made no claim that the provision was
ambiguous, and the court confÍmed

that by stating that, absent ambiguity,
a provision will be enforced, and the
only exception is if the contract violates public policy.
Because the Gibsons had paid

the separate premiums and were the
insuteds under all three policies,
which facts distinguished Cibson fuom
Lierboe, the court found that the
Gibsons had "every expectation of

TRIALSMITH
MTLA parblers with TrialSmith in hosting the on-line
MTLA litigation bank. TrialSmith will scan your documents
to CDROM for free. Call 800.443.1757 for details.
Test Drive at www.TrialSmith.com
Formerly DepoConnect.com. A member service of Montana Trial Lawyers Association.
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receiving" the coverage sought and
that the exclusion defeated coverage
for which valuable consideration had
been paid. Consequently, the court
voided the owned- vehicle exclusion
in the Med Pay coverage as against
public poJicy insofar as it acted as an
anti-stacking.provision. Cibson is one
of the clearer cases where the coutt
has used the doctrine of reasonable
expectations absent ambiguity to void
an insurance provision.

Hardl

u. Progressiue Special4t Ins.

Co.,n Q003) involved the same basic
issues as the 1986 federal Osborn case

that wül be discussed later. ,\s in
Osborn, the policy defined an
underinsured motor vehicle as one
with BI limits less than the insured's
UIM limit and coupled the UIM
coverage v¡ith a provision that offset

anyBI coverage received from the
tortfeasot agatnst the UIM benefit
due. The result was that there wâs no
situation in which the insured could
ever recoYer the $50,000 UIM shown
on the declarations page.
The court n Harþ lumped the
public policy issues together, saying
"[w]e conclude that the offset provision, as well as the definition of
underinsured motorist, violate
Montana pubJic poJicy because they
create an ambþity regarding coverage, render coverage that Ptogressive
promised to provide illusory, and
defeat the insuted's reasonable expectaion." The case cited and likeþ followed Osborn but does not shed much
Jight on the law of teasonable expectations except for its indication that
defeating the insured's reasonable
expectations violates public policy and
is a ground for voiding the provision.

The above Line of cases establishes that orìe carl void an insurance
provision for violating the insuted's
reasonable expectations and regardless

of whether the provision is

ambiguous. The problem is that
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Montana courts have occasionally
insisted that Montana requires
ambiguity as a prerequisite to any
reasonable expectalions inquiry.

Federal cases requiring ambiguity
before applyrng the reasonable

expectâtions doctrine
In contrast, Montana federal
courts began their anaþsis of the
reasonable expectations doctrine via
traditional contract law interpretation; where the presence of ambiguity is the threshold issue. In 1986,
Federal District Judge Lovell voided
provisions of Transamerica Insurance Company's auto policy in
Transamerica Insøraruce Groap u. Osborn.l8

There, the insurer issued a declara-

tions page promising $50,000

of

Underinsured Motorist coverage.
Flowevet, the policy defìned an
underinsured motor vehicle âs one
with BI limits less than the insured's
UIM limit and coupled the UIM with
a provision that offset any BI coverage received from the tortfeasor
against the UIM benefit due. The
import of the provisions was that,
under no circumstances could the
insuted ever teceive more than
$25,000 UIM coverage. (fhis was the
sarhe fact scenario of LIarþ (2003)
discussed above.)
Consequently, Judge Lovell

found the UIM defìnition "ambþous and inconsistent with the limits
of Jiability expressed on the Declarations Page" and described it as "an
inherent ambiguity in the policy
which cannot be reconciled." The
court held the offending vehicle to
be underinsured though its BI policy
limits exceeded the UIM limit of
Osborn's poJicy and held the policy
definition of underinsured motor
vehicle void as against pubJic potcy
of the State of Montana, saying of
that public policy:

These recent decisions indicate

the policy behind the laws of
Montana with respect to insurance. The underþing theme is
the protection of the reasorlable expectations of he insured at the time the policy
was putchased.

The court 'tn O¡born clearþ found
ambþity and just as clearþ voided
the offending provision for violating
the reasonable expectations of the
insuted.
Similarly,

in

lWellcome u. Home Ins.

Co. (1,991),1e a trial court imposed a
sanction ofl attorney Page NØellcome
and the insurer he represented for
violations of the court's orders regarding conduct of uoir dire, exam)nation of witnesses, and argument.
Wellcome's errors and omissions
catrter, Home Insurance Company,
refused to pay the sanctions citing its
policy exclusion for payment of
"fìres or statutory penalties whether
imposed by law oï otherwise. . . "
In a fedetal action against Home
Insurance Company, W'ellcome
sought summary judgment on the
grounds (1) that the term "fine" was
ambiguous and, Q) that coverage
should be required under the reasonable expectations doctrine. fnstead,
the Federal Coutt granted summary
judgment to Home fnsurance Company finding that the exclusion was
unambiguous clearþ excluding payments for money ordered paid by a
trial coutt fot misconduct.

Judge Hatfìeld discussed
of the reasonable expectations doctrine noting that
it was recognized in Montana and
itttng Transamerica u. Ro1/e. However,
he said of the doctdne that "its precise dimensions have never been
refìned," and asserted that "it has
been utilized in other jurisdictions
\)Øellcome's invocation

to resolve ambiguities in insurance
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policies in ordet that the policies
comport v¡ith the insured's reasonable
expectat-ions," He then went on to say:

The rationale upon which the
doctdne is based is in accord
with Montana's strong public

doctrine to void an "ofher insurance"
clause which acted as an anti-stacking
provision in BenneÍt u. State Farm Mat.
Aøto. Ins. C0.20 (Ironically, Hatfield's
decision was also appealed to the
Ninth Circuit and certified from there

to the Montana Supreme Court.)

policy of protecting insureds

After fìnding the clause ambiguous,

from seeing insurance cover-

Hatfield reasoned that voiding the

age defeated by an insurer's

clause comported with the insured's
reasonable expectations.2l ÏØhen that

use

of confusing or

ambigr,r-

ous policy language. Sæ, Rodlì
u. Anerican Barukers Ins. Co. Of
Florida, 44 Mont.St.Rprtr. 1 888
(D. Mont. 1987).

Hatfield said that the idea that
the doctrine applied to all coverage
disputes regardless of the presence
of ambiguity was a minority view and
concluded from the Transamerica u.
Ro1le case that Montana would follow
the majority view, i.e., that the doctrine is only used to resolve ambþity. It is diffìcult to see how he
reached such a conclusion based on
anything the Montana Supteme Court
said in Transamerica u. Roje which
involved no ambiguity and voided a
family exclusion for violating the
insured's reasonable expectations.
Hatfìeld concluded that Wellcome
"may not rely upon the doctrine to
create coverage which, by the clear
terms of the policy, did not exist."
Hatfìeld's decision, which was
appealed, is a classic example of
cases requiring ambigurty before the
doctrine can be applied. In other
words, the doctrine's only use would
be to resolve ambþities. ìØhen the
decision was appealed to the Ninth
Circuit, that court certifìed the issues
to the Montana Supteme Court,
which approached the reasonable
expectations issue differently as
be discussed below.

will

Judge Hatfield had also previ-

ously found ambiguity and then
applied the reasonable expectations

Tru¡r TnBNos -
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61,-6-1,03 et. seq.

In Shook, Judge Hatfìeld, held
that "an exclusionary endorsement

it certifìed to the Montana

Supreme Court the question whether
an "othef insufance" clause that

prohibits stacking of underinsured
motorist coveÍage provided by separate policies from the same insurer is

void as against public poJicy?
\)Øhile the Montana Supreme

Court appeared to be pursuing a
I(eetonesque poJicy of voiding insurance provisions soleþ for violating an
insured's reasonable expectations,
Federal Judge Hatfield persisted in

his apparent belief that Montana law
required ambiguity. He did so even
though appeals of his decisions were
going to the Ninth Circuit which was
certifying the questions to the Montana Supteme Court which was not
requiring ambiguity to trþger the
reasonable expectations doctrine.

In September of 1.994, in Sltook
Aata Ins. Co. of

clause declated invalid as against

public policy for not meeting the
minimum coverage requirements of
the Mandatory Liability Law, MCA
S 61-6-301 and the Motor Vehicle
Financial Responsibility Act, MCÂ

$

decision was appealed to the Ninth

Circuit,

tequired by law." By excluding coverage only for the amounts in excess of
the minimum limits required by law,
the insurer hoped to avoid having the

u.

State Farnu Mat.

Judge Hatfìeld was
confronted with another auto acitdent case in which the question was
whether a "modified" famly exclusion was invalid either as a mattet of
public policy or because it violated
Bloomington,2z

the insured's reasonable expectations.
There, the passenger wife sued her
driver husband for negligence resulting in her injury. State Farm's "modifìed household exclusion" provided
that there was no coverage for bodily
injury to a farrnly member "to the
extent the limits of JiabiJity of this
policy exceed the limits of liabiJity

which operates to limit coverage to
the statBtory minimum amounts
established by MCA $ 61-ó-301 is not
violative of the public policy inherent

in Montana's mandatory insurance
law" He then addressed whether the
modified exclusion was invalid under
the doctrine of reasonable expectations which he said, "recognizes an
insured is entitled to fully expect the
coverage provided by a policy will be
consistent with the language of the
policy as understood by the average
consumer." Hatfield cited Ro-yle and
lYellcome

and then said:

Stated another way, the insured
has the right to make an in-

formed decision regarding the
security he will purchase for
himself and his farntly, and an

insurance company, granted
the privilege to market its
product in the State of Montana, will not be allowed to
vitiate that right through the

utilzation of a policy that creates

ambþity regarding the

coverage afforded.
Judge Hatfìeld asserted that Ro/e
"acknowledged the vitality of the
'reasonable expectations' docttine"
but never undertook to defìne its
precise dimensions." He stated that
applylng the doctrine to all questions
of insurance coverage regardless of
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ambiguities was the minority view of
a limited number of jurisdictions
while the majority utilzed the doc-

trine to resolve ambiguities. Next, he
set forth several tenets

of the law of

ambiguity:

fÂ]mbiguity does not exist
because a claimant says so.

fFl]owevet, if the language
employed in an insurance contr^ct,
more particularly, an
^nd
exclusion, is clear and unambiguous, the language controls,

however, separates the 'household

and an expectation which is

Anderson found ambiguity and then

contrary to the language is not

resolved

It
fìed household exclusion capable
more than one corlstruction and
therefore ambþous. Ultimately

**>k

Hatfield held:

an insurance poJicy requires an

examination

of

the language
utilized from the viewpoint of
a consumer of average intelligence, not trained in the law or
in the insurance business.

The determination of whether
the expectations of the putchaser of an insurance policy
are objectively reasonable must
begin with an assessment of
the nature of the security

which a reasonably ptudent
layman would understand that
the policy is generally desþed
to provide.

***

The language employed in the
policy must then be reviewed,
in Jight of the policy's purpose,
to determine whether the language is clear and subject to
only one meaning or whether,
from the perspective of the
insured, the language is subject
interpretation s.

l".tt*rtn*
If the language is capable of

more than one constfuction,
an ambiguity exists which
must be construed against the
insurer.

***
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Federal Magistrate Judge Rich

Insarance Companj u. Owen,23 (2006).

Judge Hatfìeld found the modi-

ing or phraseology of the contract is reasonably subject to
rwo different i nterpretations.

ff]he determination of
whethet an ambiguity exists in

and relation to this broad proclamation of JiabiJity'covetage."

it with the reasonable expectations doctrine in Progrusiue Casøalry

"objectively reasonable."

can only exist where the word-

exclusion'both in time and in space

of

In view of the emasculating
effect the "household exclusion" has upon the securiry
provided by a liabüity policy,
the reasonable consumer
would legitimately expect a
caveat of that magnitude to
be strategically located. The
obscure positioning of the
exclusion v¡ould lead a reasonable consumer to interpret the
language of the exclusion in
the most reasonably limited
mannef.
Judge Hatfìeld deirded Shook
consistently with his view that the

rightful role of reasonable expectations is as a temedy when dealing
with contracrual ambiguity.
Âs an aside, the author notes
that, in doingso,Judge Hatfìeld cutiously claimed not to be persuaded by
any argument of "structural ambþity" while agreeing thar "the positioning of the exclusion, in relation to the
general coverage provision, lends
itself to the creation of the ambiguity
in the exclusion." He added, "However, given the inclisputable importance of the household exclusion to
the average coflsumef, the stfuctufe
of the policy takes on added signifìcance," and also said, "The poìicy,

There, he was confronted with the
problem caused when the insurer
makes a closely held corporation
the only named insured on an auto
policy that provides coverage for
bodily injury. Arlene Owen was a vice
president, secretary and rìirector of
a corporation in which she and her
husband were the only shareholders.
She suffered severe injury when
loading hay bales on a semi she was
driving that didn't belong to the corporation. The company refused het
demand for UIM benefits on the
ground that the cotporation was the
only named insured.
Judge Anderson recited the prin-

cþle that, "If ambþity exists, the

covrt m^y consider the reasonable
expectations of the insured." Anderson found that "Simply put, it is
impossible to read and understand
this policy by examining individual
coverages," and concluded that the
only way to make sense of it was "to
add human named insureds as to
those coverages that, by their very
Írar)re, can only apply to humans."
Ultimately, he held that Arlene
Owens, in her positions with the
corporalion could reasonably have
expected that she would be covered
for UIM and medical bene{ìts under
Progressive's policy with the corpora-

tion. The

case

is a classic application

of the school of thought that one
must fìnd ambþity after which the
reasonable expectations of the insuted can be consideted in determining the meaning of the poJicy.
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An aberrant decision of the
Montana Supreme Court requiring
ambiguity
Ârguably, as the result
large numbet

of

the

of

federal cases where
the court only applied teasonable
expectations with the presence of

contractual ambþity, the Montana
Supreme Court began to file similat
case decisions. For the fitst time, in
1998, the Montana Supreme Court in
Coønterþoint, Inc. u. Essex Ins. Co.2a

declined to apply the reasonable expectations doctrine while using language indicating it would only do so
after finding ambiguity. There, the
court upheld an exclusion for claims
arising out of termination of employment where the operator of a nonprofit group home was sued for
wrongful dischatge. The coutt tefused to consider reasonable expectations or apply rules for interpreting
adhesion contracts because it concluded the provision was unambþous and enforceable as written. The

court said:
This Court has said that
"[e]xpectations which are contrary to a clear exclusion ftom
covefâge afe not'objectively
reasonable."' (Citing lYelhome
and Statqnaø) Furthermore, we
consider special rules of interpreting contracts only when a
contract is ambþous. (Citing
Statlnan) Even though we
have previously tecognized an
exception to enforcing an unambiguous insurance contract
term when the term violates
publìc policy, this exception is
not before us. (Citing Aøgøstine
u. Sirnonson (1,991))'zs

doctrine absent

in

ambþity

since Ro1le

1.979. Furthermore, the assertion

that the court would only consider
the doctrine if it found ambigurty
first was contradicted two months
later when the court decided American
Famiþ møt. In¡. Co. u. Liuengood 26 1L6
(1997) in December 1998.
In L;iuengood, Henninger negli-

gently injurecl Livengoods whìle
driving a van belonging to her roommate, Frehse. Henninger's personal
auto and Frehse's van were both
insuted under separate poJicies by
American which defended and paid
the loss under Frehse's policy since
Henninger wâs an insured by reason
of het petmissive use. The company
refused to pay under the Bodily Injury coverage of Henninger's policy
because

of its "non-owned

auto
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Cases in which clear exclusions
from coverage are deemed to
defeat the insured's reasonable
expectations

exclusion" that excluded coverage for

"bodily injury or property damage
adsing out of the use of a vehicle,
other than your insured car, which is
owned by or funished ot available
fot tegular use by you or any tesident
of your household."
The District Court granted summary judgment to Ämerican, and the
Livengoods raised three issues at the
Montana Supreme Court: (1) whether
the exclusion applied, (2) whether it
violated Montana public poJicy, and
(3) whether it violated the reasonable
expectations of the insured. After
holding that the exclusion applied
and was not violative of public
policy, the court disposed of the
reasonable expectations doctdne
argument just as it did in Søtrynan
saying "the reasonable expectations

doctrine is inapplicable where the
terms of the poJicy at issue clearþ
demonsttate an intent to exclude
coverage." (Citing IYellnne) The rea-

The court's statement wâs remarkable in light of the line of cases
in which it had been applyrng the

tively reason able."' (citing ll/e llnn e)
Again, the court considered the
separate argument that the provision
was invalid by teason of violation of
the reasonable expectations of the
insured, the impJication being that a
provision can be voided on that basis
alone. In neither Støtryzan nor
L;iuengood did the court say that it
could not or would not consider the
doctrine without an underþing ambigulty in the policy. However, proponents of the ambiguity requirement
could argue that statement was implicit in the court's assertio'n of a
"clear exclusion from covefage."

son,

of

course, is that '[e]xpectations

which are contrary to a clear exclusion from coverage are not 'objec-

A)

Montana Supreme Court
Decisions
The Montana Supreme Court has
issued a line of decisions in each of
which the court appears to make a
reasonable expectations inquiry but
concludes that the insured's expectation of coverage cannot be reasonable in the face of a clear exclusion
from coverage. The question is
whether the coutt in those cases is
applyrng the reasonable expectations
doctrine by making the inquiry absent

ambiguity, or whethet the cases stand
for the proposition that where there
is no ambiguity, the reasonable expectations doctrine does not apply. The
court appears to be applying the
doctrine to conclude that the expectation is not reasonable given a clear
exclusion from coverage. If sq the
cases further reflect that the court is
following I(eeton,
In the eadiest instance, attorney
\ü/ellcome appealed to the Ninth
Circuit Judge Hatfìeld's decision in
his case against Home Insutance
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Company (discussed above). The

Ninth Citcuit, in turn, certified to the
Montana Supteme Coutt the questions (1) whether ambiguity in the
contfact required Home to cover the
sanctions, and Q) whether the doctrine of reasonable expectations re-

quired Home to do so27. Notably, the
Ninth Circuit certifìed ambiguity and
reasonable expectations as two separate issues in a case in which trial

court judge Hatfìeld had posited that
reasonable expectations could not
exist absent ambiguity.
On certifìcation, the Montana
Supteme Court held that the policy's
exclusion of coverage for sancLions
was flot ambþous. At that point, it
could have said that the issue of rcasonable expectations was moot, there
being no ambiguity. Instead, the court
concluded that the doctrine of teasonable expectations did not require cov-

eragein the case saying: "Expectations
which are corfirary to a cleat exclusion

from coverage âre not'objectiveþ
reasonable' as we used that term in
Ro1le."

The court said, "fn neither

Rolle nor Brawn dtd we apply the docffine to require colrerâge where the
cleat policy language excluded the

coverage" (an assertion that is not
tfue, since, tnRo/e, the coutt did require Bodily Injury coverâge where the
household exclusion cleatþ excepted
it.) Nevertheless, the court appeared to
apply the doctdne to find that the
expectation was not reasonable.
Sq what was the basis of
ll/elhome? The court appeared to apply
the reasonable expectations doctrine
and found that the expectation was

not reasonable in the face of a clear
exclusion from coverage. Did the
couft consider the exclusion from
coverage clear because rùTellcome was
alawyer? Or, was it (as an 4mbigutty

proponent might argue) because one
can only consider reasonable expecta-
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tions in the face of an unclear (ambþous), exclusion from coverage?
At any rate, the case was the ftst of a
line of reasonable expectations cases

in which the coutts found no ambiguity, made the reasonable expectations inquiry, and then determined
that the insuted had no reasonable
expectation in the face of a clear
exclusion from coverage.

In

Støtlman u. Safeco Ins. Co. of
in 1997, the wife who was
injured in an auto driven by her husband recovered the Bodily Injury @f

America,2s

limit of $100,000 from their auto
policy and then asserted a clnm to
the Underinsured Motorist coverage
limit of $100,000. Safeco refused on
the ground that the UIM coverage
contained an "owned auto exclusion"
effectively denying coverage if the
person was injured in an auto owned
by a relative. The coutt tejected arguments that there was any ambiguity as
to whether a spouse wàs a "telative,"
and also held the exclusionary clause
did not violate public policy because
there is no statutory requirement for
UIM coverage in Montana.

The Støtrynan court then
addressed the doctrine under its
heading "8. Reasonable Expectations

Docftine," important to our discussion because the court had alteady
found the owned auto exclusion was
not ambiguous. The insured's contention was that the provision was void
for violation of her reasonable expectations. The court summarily rejected
that atgument on the ground that
"the reasonable expectations doctrine
is inapplicable where, as we have
found here, the terms of the insurance policy clearþ demonstrate an
intent to exclude coverage. (Citing
IVe lhorn e) Rather,' lel xpectations
which are contrary to a clear exclusion from coverage are not'objectively reason able."' (Citing lVe llnme)

Arguably, the statement is a princþle
by which one tesolves the issue of
whether a ptovision is void by reason
of the insured's reasonable expectations. However, proponents of the
theory that ambiguity is a precondition to consideration of the reasonable expectations doctine could argue
that only in the face of an unclear
(i.e., ambþous) exclusion can one
consider reasonable expectations.
In the 2000 case of Babcock u.
Farmers lrus. Exchange,2e Babcock was
tov/ing a borrowed horse trailer that
broke loose from her pickup truck
and crashed into a fence. Her insurer
paid the $500 collision coverage but
refused to pay the $4,500 loss to the
trailer under the liability coverage
because

of

exclusions to coverage

fot

property owned or transported by the
insured or rented or in the charge of
the insured. The court found the
plain and ordinary language of the
exclusions defeated coverage and
then discussed reasonable expecta-

tions at the end of the decision,
asserting that "The doctrine of reasonable expectations does not apply

to cfeate coverage where 'the terms
of the insurance policy clearly demonstrate an intent to exclude [r".h]
coverage," (Citing Statlnan) The
court found the liabiJity exclusions
"ate trot ambþous on their own
terms nor atie they ambiguous in Jight
of Babcock's policy as a whole.
Babcock's policy cleatly demonstrates
an intent to exclude liability coverage
for the damage to the borrowed

horsetrailer..."
The court in

l-,terboe u. State Farm

Mat. Aato. Ins. Co.,3o in 2003, enforced State Farm's "rìo coverage"
provision in its Medical Pay coverage
which provision contained an exclusion for injury sustained while occupying an owned auto "not insured
undet this covefage." Hence, the
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exclusion ümited the insured's Med
Pay coverage to that on the auto in
which she was riding, in effect acting
as an anti-stacking provision. The
court found the exclusion "clear and

unambþous" and rejected Lierboe's
reasonable expectations argument on

the ground that "[e]xpectations which
are contrary to a clear exclusion from
coverage are not objectively reasonable." (Citing Søtqnan and IYellcone)

The court said there was no coverage
on any vehicle not occupied, so thete
was r1o stacking issue. It also said that
I-ierboe had no reasonable expecta-

tion of coveÍage under the second
policy, because she did not quali$/ as
an insured undet more than one Med
Pay coverage. Again, the inquiry
appears to have been whether the
provision was void for violating reasonable expectations, not whether
reasonable expectations could resolve
an ambiguity.

In

Cenera/i-U.5. Branch

u.

Alexønder,3l73 P.3d 800. (2004) the

court seemed to recognize the ftne
line between ruling the reasonable
expectations doctrine inapplicable in
of a clear exclusion and
fìnding the jnsured's expectations

the face

unreasonable
exclusion:

in the face of a clear

have held that "[e]xpectations that ùre contrary to a

NØe

cleat exclusion from coverage
are not 'objectiveþ reasonable,'

although the "reasonable expectations docttine" does not
apply in situations "where
clear policy language excluded

the coverage."

In
C0.32

Hanuilton u. Triniry Uniuersal Ins.

Q006), the Montana Supreme

Court upheld an "owned vehicle"
exclusion where it was alleged to
violate reasonable expectations of the
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under his parents'policies, and Trinity refused on the basis of the ownecl

doctrine could not be met. Notably,
the court tteated reasonable expectations as à separàte issue after it had
already held that the exclusion was
unambþous. Once again, the court
could have said it could not consider
the doctrine if there was no ambþity. Instead, it said that "expectations
that are contrary to a clear exclusion
fiom coverage are not objectively

vehicle exclusion.

reasonable."

insured. There, ZackH.amJlton, age
23, was injuted whle driving his
uninsured Toyota pickup truck. He
lived with his parents who insured
three vehicles with Trinity under
poJicies providing UIM coverage.
,\fter settling for the tortfeasor's BI
limits, he claimed the UIM benefits

The Hamiltons claimed the exclusion should be invalidated as contrary to their reasonable expectations.
The court specifìcaþ noted that they
\¡r''ere not claiming it was ambþous
but complained instead that a person
had to look to several places in the

policy to determine whether coverage
was provided. The court refused the

B) Fedetal Court Decisions
A strong fedetal court decision
byJudge Molloy, Han¡on u. Emþloyrs
Matual Casaa/ry Co.,3a is consistent
v¡ith the holdings of the Montana
Supreme Court. The case involved
the frustrating situation where the
insurer of a closeþ held family cor-

argument of invalidity on the twin
grounds that (1) the reasonable expectations doctrine is ìnapplicable in
the face of a clear exclusion from
liability, expectations corttrzLry to
^
clear exclusion are not objectiveþ
reasonable, nnd Q) "it is not objectiveþ reasonable for an insured to
expect to receive underinsured motorist coverage for a vehicle fot which
he or she has not purchased any avTo-

poration issues a policy providing
coverages for "bodily injury'' but
makes the cotporation, which cannot
suffer "bodily injury" the named

mobile insurance."

identifiable offìcers and shateholders

Finally, in Newbør1 u. State Farm
Fire dv Cal Ins. Co. of Bloomirugton,

of

il1.,33 State

Farm's Medical Pay cover-

from coverage
"to the extent workers compensation
benefìts are required to be payable."
Newbury was injured in a work reage had an exclusion

lated vehicle/pedestrian accident.
State Farm refused to p^y his $17,230
in medicals on the grounds that work
comp had paid them so that they
were clearþ excluded.
The Montana Supreme Court
found the exclusion unambiguous
and clearly demonstrated an intent to
exclude coverage so that the requirements of the reasonable expectations

insured. In Hager

u.

American IYest

C0.,35 Judge Hatfield in 1989
held, "\Øhete an automobile liability
policy containing the 'family member'

Insør.

terminology has been issued to a
closely held corporation, it is entireþ
legiumate to conclude the readily
that corporate entity fall within the
purview of that terminology."
Hanson, who was injured as a
pedestrian by an underinsured motorist was a principal in a famtly closely
held corporation. To the insurer's
assertion that he was not an insured,
Hanson argued that coverages applying only to "bodily injury'' cannot be
suffered by a corpotation, so that a
reasonable consumer would have a
teasonable expectation that the coverage would apply to the family members or officers involved in the
cotporation.
NØithout fìnding any ambiguity,
Judge Molloy applied the teasonable
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expectations doctrine but found that,
because Hanson was a pedestrian,

and the policy only provided UM/
UIM to other than named insureds

if

they were occupying an insured vehicle, Hanson could have no reasonâble expectation of coverage. In fact,

Molloy said "Thus, the clear language
of the insurance contract rebuts
Plaintiffs' reasonable expectations
argument, which is not saved by
resort to policy arguments." (Ihe
court found for plaintiff, however,
on other grounds.) This was a case
in which, finding no ambiguity, the
judge made a reasonable expectations
inquiry and determined that there
was no ground for the insured's
expectation that the poJicy would

provide UIM coverage to pedestrians.
Hovrever, the case allows reasonable
expectations inquity without any

ambiguity.

Conclusion
Analyzng reasonable expectations cases in Montana reveals that
typically t'teasonable expectations" is
the last issue discussed in court decisions. This may be because counsel
advocates the doctrine last in briefs,
perhaps teflecting a lack of certainty
about the doctrine's effectiveness.

The confusion engendered because
the federal courts' require ambþity
while the Montana Supreme Coutt
does not, makes for inconsistency,
lack

of

claÅty, and absence

of

for counsel.
Counsel need to keep clarity
about the reasonable expectations
assuredness

doctdne by presenting the doctrine's
base in unconscionabiJity and not
ambiguity. Insurance policies are
contracts of adhesion. Hence, it is

'I

imperative that coufts assess the
nature of the secutity which a reasonably prudent layman would understand the policy is generally desþed
to provide and act to protect that
expectation in the face of technical
language that defeats it. To achieve
an equitable result, the court needs to

watch for unconscionable advantage
and give up the search for ambiguity
which only yields tortured and unpredictable decisions. To achieve this
change, advocates must have a cLear
understanding of the reasonable
expectations doctrine and recognize
its importance and utility. The Montana Supreme Court in Counterþoint,
Inc. u. Essex Ins. Ca (1998) muddled

the doctdne when it indicated the
belief that it had been requiring
ambigurty even though a line of
decisions issued since 1979 said
otherwise. The federal courts, which
are supposed to be applying Montana
law, appear oblivious to the Montana
Supteme Court decisions on the

doctrine.
If "reasonable expectations" did
not apply absent ambiguity, what
would stop an insurer fiom drafting
clear but heinous exclusions to optional coverages like UIM and Med
Pay? Public policy protects the man-

d^toty coverages of BI and UM,
because an exclusion must not infringe the coverage required by statute. But, the public policy protectìng
UIM and Med Pay is the doctrine of
reasonable expectations of the insured as set out by Professor l(eeton
and by the Montana Supreme Court
'tn Tran¡america u. Rofle

in
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